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Colgan 3407, Feb 2009, Buffalo: Is "Safety Delayed" in reality "Safety Denied"?:Why is the FAA so Slow to do its own Work?

The Buffalo Feb, 2009, Colgan Air mishap killing more than 50 people occurred nearly 3 years ago. In the past few days the FAA has come out ...

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Why Did 44 Die in Russian TU 134 crash near Petrozavodsk



Again, why? Fog does not cause a plane to crash. If a plane is in fog and not able to descend to the runway, the procedure is for the crew to execute a missed approach and try another approach, hold for the weather to improve or divert to an alternate field nearby with better weather.

Sounds like this crew was quite a distance away from the field when they hit the ground. Nothing here in this report makes any sense. Did the crew try to get below the overcast and strike an obstacle? Did the crew miss-set the altimeter and go too low inadvertently? Did the crew set in the incorrect navigation radios and wind up somewhere other than their planned approach route?

There are so many questions that should be asked immediately but to wait 1-2 years to hear the answers seems to most people a very long time and somewhat counter intuitive for a safety investigation.

Friday, June 10, 2011

AF 447: Basic Instrument Training

The second issue seems to be flight crew training when in heavy turbulence and when the pitot-static system is not operating.
Basic Instrument flying procedures in convective turbulence recommend a shift of instrument scan to attitude instruments and a disregard for pitot-static instruments, such as airspeed, vsi and altimeter. The procedure is to keep the wings level and the nose level with the attitude instruments. As the acft bounces along through the area of heavy turbulence and as the pitot-static system is affected by rain, ice and the pressure variations encountered in heavy turbulence, scan on the attitude instruments allows the crew to keep the acft straight and level.

Also, the power is monitored so that it remains at cruise power settings, neither more nor less and this keeps the airspeed relatively constant.

The crew should have slowed the acft to turbulent penetration airspeed prior to penetrating an area of turbulence or upon penetration. This speed allows the wings to accept g loadings due to turbulence but not be moving fast enough to over stress the wing g limits.

I wonder if in fact AF training covered these areas and if they allowed flight crew to practice all of these procedures?

Getting into heavy turbulence is to be avoided, but knowing these procedures is critical to survival in the event that convective weather is encountered.

Other procedures include all of the various heaters and engine ignition circuits should be placed on.

Using automation in these circumstances is not a good idea because the programming for automation usually involves smooth air and one g flight.

Could reliance on automation in these circumstances indicate a weakness in training proficiency on the part of this airline and this crew? Is this the second issue for AF, AB, BEA and all other airlines following this investigation?